Notice how [Douglas] Futuyma conflates these definitions (of science) in the following statement taken from Science on Trial: The Case for Evolution, the most widely used college evolutionary textbook: Continue reading
Many simply refuse to consider the design hypothesis on the grounds that it does not qualify as “scientific.” Such critics affirm an extraevidential principle known as “methodological naturalism”. Methodological naturalism (MN) asserts that for a hypothesis, theory, or explanation to qualify as “scientific” it must invoke only naturalistic or materialistic causes. Clearly, on this definition, the design hypothesis does not qualify as “scientific”. Yet, even if one grants this definition, it does not follow that some nonscientific (as defined by MN) or metaphysical hypothesis may not constitute a better, more causally adequate, explanation. Whatever its classification, the design hypothesis does constitute a better explanation than its naturalistic rivals for the origin of specified complexity in both physics and biology. Surely, simply classifying this argument as metaphysical does not refute it.
— Stephen Meyer, from Science and Evidence for Design in the Universe, p. 99
[Harvard geneticist Richard] Lewontin freely admits that science has its own problems. It has created many of our social problems (like ecological disasters), and many scientific theories are no more than “unsubstantiated just-so stories.” Nevertheless, “in the struggle between science and the supernatural,” we “take the side of science.” Why? “Because we have a prior commitment to materialism.”
— Charles Colson and Nancy Pearcey, from How Now Shall We Live?, p. 96