The Christian answer begins by saying that man is a moral creature made in the image of the Creator; that there is a law in the universe which, if broken, means that man is culpable. In this view, man is morally significant both as far as God is concerned and as far as his fellow men are concerned.
— Francis Schaeffer, from The God Who Is There, p. 105
If the human person is designed … [then] there are moral laws that advance human flourishing.
— Stephen Meyer, from CNS News interview with Terry Jeffrey at 26:57
Because the God of the Bible is there, real morals exist. Within this framework I can say one action is right and another wrong, without talking nonsense.
— Francis Schaeffer, from The God Who Is There, p. 107
Nontheists will typically counter the moral argument with a dilemma: Is something good because God wills it, or does God will something because it is good? The first alternative makes good and evil arbitrary, whereas the second makes the good independent of God. Fortunately, the dilemma is a false one. Theists have traditionally taken a third alternative: God wills something because he is good. That is to say, what Plato called “the Good” is the moral nature of God himself. God is by nature loving, kind, impartial, and so on. He is the paradigm of goodness. Therefore, the good is not independent of God.
— William Lane Craig, from God Is Not Dead Yet, http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2008/july/13.22.html
With the Christian answer it is now possible to understand that there are true moral absolutes. There is no Law behind God, because the furthest thing back is God. The moral absolutes rest upon God’s character. The creation as He originally made it conformed to His character. The moral commands He has given to men are an expression of His character. Men as created in His image are to live by choice on the basis of what God is. The standards of morality are determined by what conforms to His character, while those things which do not conform are immoral.
— Francis Schaeffer, from The God Who is There, p. 105